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Abstract: Motivated by empirical evidence that age structure fluctuations affect relative wages
across age groups, this paper asks whether there is a steady-state age distribution that maximizes
the lifetime wages of a representative worker. The paper proves the surprising result that in a pure
labor economy with any constant returns technology, a uniform age distribution (zero population
growth) minimizes lifetime wages. The presence of other factors complicates, but does not neces-
sarily reverse, this result. Effects of age structure on age-specific productivity are incorporated into
overlapping generations models developed to analyze the economic effects of changes in population
growth rates. Analogies of the effects of age structure on life-cycle wages with intergenerational
transfer effects in consumption loan models are explored.
Acknowledgments: This research has benefited from discussions with Theodore Bergstrom and Hal
Varian.
1. Introduction
Empirical research on the effects of cohort size on wages suggests that age-specific wages are
sensitive to the relative sizes of age groups.1 Although these studies are interested in the effects
of short-term fluctuations in cohort size, the results can also be interpreted as evidence that age-
specific wages will be influenced by age structure in long-term demographic steady-states as well.
Even if all other features of two economies are similar, for exanple, workers in a rapidly growing
population with a young age distribution should have a significantly different wage profile than
workers in a population with a low growth rate and a relatively uniform age distribution. Even
though considerable attention has been given to the importance of age structure in models of the
economic effects of population growth,2 the effects of age structure on relative wages across age
groups has been virtually ignored. This paper attempts to fill this gap by analyzing the relationship
between population growth rates and life cycle wage profiles, explicitly recognizing the possibility
of imperfect substitutability of workers of different ages.
In previous research on the economic effects of population growth, two basic economic forces
drive the results. The first is the effect of population growth on capital-labor ratios, typified
by Solow's (1956) neoclassical growth model. Higher rates of population growth in such a model
unambiguously lower steady state per capita income and consumption due to a capital dilution effect
analogous to an increased rate of capital depreciation. The second common effect of population
growth is an intergenerational transfer effect typified by Samuelson's (1958) original consumption
loan model. In its simplest version, increased population growth leads to unambiguously higher per
capita lifetime utility through what amounts to a perpetually underfunded pay-as-you-go social
security system. A number of authors have attempted to combine these two effects into a single
model, beginning with Samuelson (1975).3 Models with more general treatments of age structure
have been developed by Arthur and McNicoll (1977, 1978), Lee (1980), and Willis (1982), but none
of these models has considered the effects of age structure on age-specific labor productivity.
Section 2 of this paper analyzes the relationship between factor proportions and marginal
products for the simple case of a pure labor economy in which labor can be divided into two
types. The section proves that for any concave constant returns production function, the sum of
the two marginal products is minimized when there are equal numbers of the two types of workers.
The implications of non-labor factors are considered in section 3. Section 4 analyzes the effects of
population growth rates on age-specific wages in a stable population with any number of age groups.
A uniform age distribution is shown to minimize steady state lifetime wages in a pure labor economy
with any constant returns technology. Effects of discounting are considered in section 5. Sections
1 See, for example, Welch (1979), Freeman (1979), Stapleton and Young (1984), and Berger (1985).
2 For example, Arthar and McNicoll (1977, 1978), Lee (1980), anid Willis (1982).
3 Samnuelson's first order conditions for an optirnurn growth rate actually imply a welfare minimumrn for a large
class of production and utility functions, as pointed out by Deardorff (1976). Deardorff proved, for example,
th at when both production and utility are Cobb-Douglas, the benefits from high capital labor ratios of negative
growth rates and the "intergeiterational chain letter" windfalls of positive growth rates are unbounded, and
always offset the losses working in the opposite direction. No finite optirnurn population growth rate exists for
such a model, a result explored in detail in Samuelson's (1976) reply to Deardorff.
6 and 7 incorporate effects of age structure on age-specific labor productivity into overlapping
generations models of the effects of population growth on life cycle consumption profiles. Previous
comparative steady state results on the effects of population growth on lifetime consumption are
shown to generalize in a straightforward way when the conventional assumption that workers of
di Iferent ages are perfect substitutes is replaced with a completely general production function.
Section 8 concludes the paper and compares the results with the implications of Samuelson's original
consumption loan model.
2. Factor Proportions and Factor Payments Under Constant Returns Technology
A fundamental but little recognized property of linearly homogeneous functions forms the foun-
dation for many of the results developed below. The simplest form of the result can be demonstrated
for an economy with two types of workers:
Proposition 1. If L total workers are divided into two types, L1 and L2 , and total output is
given by a concave constant returns to scale production function Y = F(L1, L2 ), the sum of the two
marginal products F1 + F2 attains a global minimum when L 1 = L2.
To prove the result, consider the problem of choosing the fraction r1, where L1 = ir1 L and
L2 = (1 - r1)L. Assuming that workers of each type are paid their marginal products, what effect
will the choice of i 1 have on the sum of the two wages W = Wi + w2 = F1 + F2? Noting that
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= (F11 - F22)L.
The sign of F11 - F2 2 will be indeterminate in general, but becomes a simple function of
ir1 under constant returns to scale. Under constant returns it will be analytically convenient to
normalize by the total number of workers. Using lower case letters to denote per worker quantities,
define the per worker production function y = f(L 1,L 2) F=P(x 1 ,ir 2), where w; = L,/L. The
properties of homogeneous functions require that the derivatives of the total production function
F are related to the derivatives of the per worker production function f by the conditions Fi = fi,
F; = f;;L 1, and Fik = fijkL 2, where F; = OF/aL;, f; = Of/Or;, etc. The condition on
first derivatives implies that wages are independent of total population size, while the condition
on second derivatives implies that (1) can be reduced to OWf/Or1 = fn- 122, a result which is
independent of L. Given constant returns, Euler's theorem implies that furi + fa1 r2 = 0. Using
the fact that 121 = 112, thus condition implies that
122= fui (1.i1r
2
Substituting into (1), then
W ( rl 2 1- 27r
-- =i 1 2- = 2f1;] (2)or, 1 - x1 (1 - x1)2
By inspection, the derivative in (2) is equal to zero when ri = .5. To see whether this critical point
is a minimum or maximum, differentiation of (2) gives
02W 1- 2ir1 -21 2r1
2 = (fi1 -f112) [(1- 2 - 2f11(1 - r1) + 2f1 [ 21.) (3)
The first and last terms equal zero when ir 1 = .5, making the entire expression unambiguously
positive if fI < 0. Equal division of the workers therefore gives the global minimum W for any
concave F. It is clear by inspection of (2) that the derivative is positive for all n7r > .5, and is
negative for all r1 < .5 as long as fiu < 0. This establishes Proposition 1.4 If L1 and L 2 are the
number of young and old workers respectively, then (L 1 f[L 2) -1 is the labor force growth rate. A
worker passing through the labor force with one period in each age group will earn W total lifetime
wages. The result in (2), then, implies that for a pure labor economy with constant returns to scale,
a stationary population produces the lifetime wage minimizing age structure. Either a positive or
negative growth rate of the labor force will lead to greater lifetime wages for all workers. There
is no finite growth rate that maximizes lifetime wages. As seen in (2), lifetime wages continually
increase with increases in 7r1 above .5 or with decreases in ni below .5
Proposition 1 holds for any concave constant returns production function in a pure labor
economy, with no assumption about productivity differences or the elasticity of substitution between
the two types of workers other than that implied by concavity. It is interesting to compare this
result to the effect of the choice of wr1 on total output. Consider, for example, a CES production
function Y = [3L1 + (1- /3)Lz]/P. If the two types of workers have equal productivity parameters,
i.e. # = .5, then total output will always be maximized when L1 = L2 . If # $ .5 then the division
of labor that maximizes total output will depend on the elasticity of substitution, with any result
possible in general. For all values of p and p, however, w1 + W2 always attains a. global minimum
when there are equal numbers of workers of each type.
If the age distribution of workers remains constant and each worker spends one period as type
1 and one period as type 2, these results imply the paradoxical condition that the distribution of
workers that maximizes total output in each period may be the distribution that minimizes each
worker's lifetime income. Total (or per worker) output in each period need not have any relation
4 There is an interesting dual to Proposition 1, although the applications are less obvious. Note that the cost
function C(wi , tv2, Y) corresponding to any production function F(L 1 , L2 ) is hornogeneous of degree one and
the conditional factor demands L;(wi , 2, Y) are the first derivatives of C by Shephard's lemma. if there were
a constraint on the sum of the wages to; + W2 = W, with wages set at to; = a1 W, tV2 = (1 - ai)W, and
if firms chose the cost minimizing labor inpats given those wages, then cai = .5 would always generate the
minimum total employment L1 + L2 for all possible values of a1. Skewed wages would always generate higher
employment than equal wages, subject to a constraint on the sum of the two wages.
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to a representative worker's lifetime welfare. In the simple case in which workers seek to maximize
lifetime income, a uniform age distribution is always the worst of all possible worlds in in this
simple example of a pure labor economy.5
Consider a rapidly growing population, in which there are always many times more young
workers than old workers. Young workers may have much lower wages than old workers, but
Proposition 1 guarantees that w1 + w2 is greater than it would be if the same number of workers
were rearranged so that there equal numbers at each age. The apparent inefficiency that total
output in each period could be increased if there were equal numbers at each age is unimportant to
the workers, as long as the positive growth rate can be sustained. If maximizing lifetime wages were
an appropriate welfare criterion, any potential new worker would choose to enter the rapidly growing
population rather than a stationary population as long as the growth rate persists throughout the
worker's lifetime. The depressed ages earned while young are guaranteed to be more than offset by
the higher wages earned while old. Similarities and differences between this result and results for
a Samuelson type pure consumption loan economy will be discussed below.
3. Effects of Non-Labor Factors of Production
The effect of introducing a non-labor factor of production can be seen by augmenting the
production function, Y = F(L1, L2, K), where K can be thought of as a fixed resource, such as
land, or as a reproducible factor, such as capital. (Distinctions between the two types on non-labor
factors will be discussed below.) Assuming that K is exogenous and unaffected by the choice of
7r1, the introduction of K has no effect on the derivation of (1), so under constant returns it is still
true that OW/Oiri = (I - f22). Euler's theorem now implies that f117r+ f21r2 = -fklk, where
k = K/L, and therefore that
k 1 -wi
fi = -fk1-- -112 wi.
W1 WI1-
Using the analogous expression for f22, and substituting into (1), the derivative in (2) generalizes
to
OW F1-2 1 1+[fk2 fk1
Bini (1 - 7r1)2 7r2 1
The first term in (4) is zero when r = .5, is positive for all w1 > .5, and is negative for
all w1 < .5. The sign of the second term in (4) is indeterminate in general, and depends on the
complementarity between K and workers of different ages. Note, however, that if W attains a
critical point at w1 = .5, then it must be the case that fki = fk2 at that point, since the first term
s Even if a worker could choose the steady state age distribution in the population, maximizing lifetime wages
is not necessarily an appropriate objective function for the worker. The effect of age structure on lifetime
wages provides an interesting baseline for the analysis, however. The effects of discounting lifetime wages are
considered below, along with consideration of the effects of age structure on the possibilities for intertemporal
consumption smoothing.
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must equal zero. The second derivative is
12W 1 - 21r 1 - 2r1
2 =(fil - fii) 2 - 2fn(1 - 1)- + 2f (5)
+ k [2~1 (fk12 - fk22) - 2-2 fk2 + V1 7fk1 - 1 (fkll - fk1 2 )].
If W attains a critical point at r1 = .5, implying that r 1 = r2 and fkl = fk2, then (5) reduces to
2  -f=11+ 2k(fkl2 - Al + fk12 - fk22). (6)
81, 4
No general restrictions can be placed on the third derivatives in the second term that make the sign
of the term unambiguous. We cannot rule out the possibility that the term is negative and large
enough in absolute value to offset the first term, which will always be positive under concavity. It is
possible, then, that in the presence of other factors a uniform distribution of workers will maximize
lifetime wages. It is also possible that a uniform distribution continues to minimize lifetime wages,
as it does in the absence of non-labor factors. Some obvious restrictions on the third derivatives
will guarantee that the second derivative is positive when W(iri) attains a critical point at r 1 = .5.
The simplest is that fk12 = fl1 = fk22 when r1 = r2 and fki = fk2. This implies a symmetry in
the relationship between K and the two kinds of labor that is consistent with the requirement that
fki = fk2 when xi = 62-
If K represents reproducible capital, rather than a fixed resource like land, then there may be
a direct effect of the age distribution on K. The effects of population growth and age structure
on capital-labor ratios have been the principle focus of most models of the economic effects of
population growth. Although a complete treatment of the relationship between population growth
and capital accumulation is beyond the scope of this paper, the issue will be addressed below in
analyzing golden rule steady states.
4. Population Growth, Age Structure, and Lifetime Wages
A more complete model of the relationship between age structure and wage profiles can be
constructed by considering a stable population with a constant population growth rate. The number
of persons aged i at time t, denoted Li,,, is by definition Li,e = Bt-;pi, where Be denotes births
in period t and p; denotes the probability of survival from birth to age i, assumed to be invariant
over time. If age-specific fertility and mortality rates remain constant over time, then by well
known ergodicity properties7 the population will converge to a stable population with a constant
proportional age distribution. Births and the size of every age group will grow at some constant
growth rate g. Expressed in discrete time, Be = B0(1+g)t, and therefore L;, = B1(1+±9)-. Total
6 If the production function can be written as F(K, G(L1, L2 )), then conditional on there being a critical point
in W(wi) at w1 = .5, that point will be a minimum if G11 = G22 when Li = L2.
7 See Arthur (1981) for a recent restatement and proof of these results.
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population size at time t will be Pt = E," L;,pi = B Ee'(1 + g)-ip;, where w is the highest age in
the population.
For demographic simplicity, assume all workers die at exactly age w, so that mortality can be
ignored.8 I)efining ire as the (constant) proportion of workers aged i in the steady state, the effect
of a fertility induced change in the population growth rate on this proportion is
-9g= (i -i),(1+ g) '
where i = E iri is the mean age of the labor force. An increase in the population growth rate
causes an increase in the steady state proportion of workers at all ages below the mean age and a
decrease in the proportion of workers at all ages above the mean age. Assuming constant returns
technology, the marginal products of workers are unaffected by total population size, and are
therefore constant in the steady state, determined only by the relative sizes of age groups in a pure
labor economy. If wages at each age are equal to marginal products then total lifetime wages are
given by W = F> F, = F, f,. The effect of the population growth rate on lifetime wages is
aW r1
= f
=(1 + g)~1 E Zir,(i -j)f ()
=(1+g)~ 3IZwifii -Zijrifi 4
This result holds for any production function, as long as g affects only the sizes of age groups and
not the relative quantity of other productive factors. In the case of a pure labor economy with
constant returns, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 2. In a pure labor economy with a concave constant returns production function
Y = F(L 1 , L 2,... , L.), where Li = Bt(1 + g)~=, with the labor force growing at a constant growth
rate g, total lifetime wages W = F= F, attain a global minimum when g =0. No finite growth rate
exists that maximizes lifetime wages.
To prove Proposition 2, note that in the case of a pure labor economy with constant returns,
8 Equivalently, assume that all workers survive from the age of entry into the labor force until some retirement
age w. Mortality before and after working life can be ignored, with "births" referring to labor force entrants,
and g representing the labor force growth rate.
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Euler's theorem requires that EJ rjfej = 0. This implies that
= _ (1+ g) 1  jrifij = -(1+g) 1 ZjlYfi,
(8)
= - (1+g)~1 3jr fi 8)f .
Under the assumption of a pure labor economy with constant returns, rfjj = - j 7 rifir, so (8)
can be simplified to
a =(1 + 9)~1 2j E 7rifij - E jrj Ef
a.ji ;i 3 (9)
=(1+ g)~1 E :j(7r - Kj)fij.
Note that Yj>,Ix~ 1  = >j (zij+ xj,). Since fig = ft, it follows that
S ( - r)f [(r -ir-)!f + i(r - i)fij] = 5 (r - iri)(j - i)fi, (10)
jijji>j .7i+>i
Substituting from (10), then, (9) can be rewritten as
OW
= (1+ g)- j (7r; - irj)(j - i)f (11)
I i>i
By (9) it is clear that W(g) attains a critical point at g = 0, since n = wr V (i,j) in a stationary
population with no mortality before age w. The second derivative is
62  1g
og = (1+ 9)-2(1 + 9) + (1+ 9)~1 (j - i)f 1 (! - a)
>j J>
r;>o.(12)
+ (1 + g)-1 E (: r; - r j)(i -i)(fiji '0 - fj
At a uniform age distribution r; = r, so the first term and last terms go to zero. The second
term is unambiguously positive, since sg > (' Vi < j. A uniform labor force age distribution
thus gives the unambiguous global minimum lifetime wages for any constant returns production
function in a pure labor economy. This establishes Proposition 2.
In a pure labor economy under constant returns the absolute size of the population has no effect
on wages-- only the relative sizes of age groups matter. If non-labor factors are introduced then it
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is necessary to explicitly model the effect of population growth on those factors. If the non-labor
factors are fixed resources, such as land, then the relative supply of the factor must necessarily
decrease with population size and there is no steady state level of output per worker. If the non-
labor factor is capital then a formal model of capital accumulation is required. Assuming that a
steady state capital-labor ratio exists, some model is required to analyze the effect of population
growth on the capital-labor ratio. As pointed out above, this issue has been the principal focus of
most previous literature on the economic effects of population growth. It is beyond the scope of
this paper to offer any new approaches to the relationship between population growth and capital
accumulation. One standard approach, the assumption that golden-rule savings is achieved in every
steady state, will be used below. More generally, the effect of population growth on capital-labor
ratios can simply be thought of as an additional term affecting lifetime wages in some unknown
direction. If this term is strongly negative, as implied by most previous models, then it may
dominate the tendency for higher rates of population growth to increase lifetime wages in a pure
labor economy.
Assuming a steady state capital-labor ratio k always exists, (7) continues to hold when a non-
labor factor K is introduced, but Euler's theorem now implies that , ir jfej = -kfik. Substituting
into (7) and allowing an effect of g on k, the result is
-w =(1 + g)~ 1  jkfik - ( jirjf,,+ fik
=(1+ ) [i (ir; - irj)(j - i)f,; + k fik(i - i) + ' Zfji.
If it is assumed that ( = 0, and if = 0 at a uniform age distribution, then >; f~k(i - i) = 0,
since the first term in (13) has already been shown to be zero when ir = 7r V(i,j). If this is true,
however, then it must be the case that flk = fjk V(i,j) when 7r= = ry. Even ignoring the final
term in (13), there are no general restrictions on the third cross-partial derivatives to establish
whether this critical point is a minimum or maximum, as discussed above in the case of two types
of workers. If an increase in the population growth rate decreases the capital-labor ratio, as it does
in a simple neoclassical growth model, then the last term further modifies the result, implying a
negative effect of population growth on lifetime wages as long as fk > 0 for all i.
5. Effects of Discounting Lifetime Wages
It is straightforward to introduce a discount rate into the wage stream. Returning to the pure
labor economy, if we redefine W as discounted lifetime wages W = >2. F,(1 +r)-', and analyze the
effects of the population growth rate on W, the result in (9) generalizes to
= (1+ g)~ j Z [i,(1 + r)~' - rJ(1+ r)~'] fh - -(1+r- i;(+)-. 14
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The second term in (14) allows the possibility that the discount rate r is itself a function of g.
Assuming for the moment that r is exogenous, making the second term in (14) equal to zero, the
result implies that there will be a critical point at the growth rate which sets ff;(1+r)-i = rj (1+r)-t
for all (i,j). Continuing to abstract from mortality, this will occur when g = r, the population
growth rate equals the discount rate. As in the case when r = 0, it is easy to show that this critical
point always gives the minimum discounted value of lifetime wages. For any exogenous discount
rate r, discounted lifetime wages attain a global minimum when the population growth rate equals
the discount rate. Evaluated at a point at which g < r (e.g. g = .01 and r = .10), an increase in g
will decrease the discounted value of lifetime wages.
The result is more complicated if r is a function of g. One important special case is when r = g
at all values of g, corresponding to Samuelson's (1958) "biological interest rate." This case has some
intuitive appeal, since it captures the relationship between age structure and the possibilities for
intergenerational borrowing.9 The value of earning high old-age wages to offset low young-age
wages in a rapidly growing population depends on the ability to borrow against old age wages. If
the young can only borrow from the old, then the interest rate must increase as the population
growth rate increases. In the case when r = g at all values of g, the result in (14) can be rewritten
by substituting g for r, noting that 8= 1 and (1+g)-' = r;i (l + g)~j:
--g)_ El [z "Zg~r "f ""- Yirw"F]
-):-[1 i i i if:v w](15)
-i-
where y is per worker output and , = j, iiriw/ >' ,riwi is a weighted mean age in which each age
is weighted by the proportion of total wages earned at that age. The result in (15) is unambiguously
negative, implying that if the discount rate r is always equal to the population growth rate g,
then increases in the growth rate must reduce the discounted value of lifetime wages. Although
lifetime wages will always increase with increases in the population growth rate, in accordance with
Proposition 2, they can never increase at the same rate as the population growth rate itself. In this
biological interest rate case, then, the discounted value of lifetime wages is maximized at the most
negative feasible population growth rate.
Although discounting of lifetime wages may be appropriate, especially in the biological interest
rate regime, discounted lifetime wages may still not be an appropriate objective function for the
representative worker. The discounted cost of any given lifetime consumption stream also declines
* See Willis (1982) for an excellent treatment of the relationship between age structure and intergenerational
debt.
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as the population growth rate increases. This means that a decline in discounted lifetime wages
does not necessarily imply a decline in lifetime utility. The following sections clarify this point
by incorporating the effects of age structure on wages with the effects on lifetime consumption
possibilities.
6. Age Structure and Social Budget Constraints with Overlapping Generations
The role of population growth and age structure in overlapping generations models has been
clarified by Arthur and McNicoll (1977, 1978) and Lee (1980) using the tools of formal demography.
''iese tools also provide insights into the results proven above on the effects of age structure on
age-specific labor productivity.
Before introducing effects of age structure on age-specific productivity it is worth reviewing
the comparative steady state results for models in which workers at different ages are perfect
substitutes. Looking at a continuous time version of the stable population analyzed above, if age-
specific fertility and mortality are constant then births and the size of every age group grow at
some constant exponential growth rate g, with Bt = Boe-gt, and Na,t = Bte-Ga. Total population
size at time t is Pt = fo' N4 ,tpa da = Bt f e-aps da, where w is highest age in the population.
To see the basic structure of these models, assume that consumption at age a is given by ca,10
labor supply is given by la, and period t production is described by a concave constant returns
production function F(Kt, Lt), where Lt is the effective labor force at time t. Total labor Lt is
a linear aggregation of the number of workers at each age, Lt = Bt f e-gapala da.11 The social
budget constraint at time t is F(Kt, Lt) = Ce + kt, where C is total consumption and K is the
time derivative of the capital stock. Generalizing Solow's growth model without age structure, this
age structured economy can be imagined to have an economic-demographic steady state growth
path with a constant proportional age distribution, a constant capital-labor ratio k and constant
age-specific consumption levels ca. In the steady state Kt = gK, so normalizing by Bt the social
budget constraint can be rewritten as
/w w[f(k) - gkJ j e-g5 pal5 da = j e-gapaC4 da, (16)
00
Following Arthur and McNicoll (1977, 1978), the simplest case is to assume that capital is accu-
10 Age-specific consumption may be chosen to maximize lifetime utility as in Arthur and McNicoll (1977). As
shown by Lee (1980), however, the principal insights of the comparative steady state results come from simply
differentiating the social budget constraint to find the change in lifetime consumption possibilities. Details
of how age-specifc consumption is altered in response to a change in population growth add little additional
information.
" In most pure consumption loan models, workers at each age receive exogenous endowments which are unaffected
by population growth (see, for example, Samuelson, 1958, and Willis, 1.982). In models with capital, wages
are affected by capital-labor ratios, and may also be affected by age-specific weights such as the la terms used
here. Arthur and McNicoli (1978) and Lee (1980) differ somewhat in their interpretation of the weights 1.
in the definition of L1. Arthur and McNicoli define them as age-specific labor force participation rates. Lee
also includes differences in productivity as reflected in wage differentials. These productivity differences are
exogenous with respect to age structure, however, and therefore implicitly assume that workers of all ages are
perfect substitutes.
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mulated by a golden-rule steady state savings rate,1 2 implying that fk = g. Drop the i subscripts
to denote the time invariant normalized total quantities L = Lt/Bt, C = C /Bt, and define
the time invariant proportions Ira = e-gapa/ f e-"ap5 da, it*= e-sepaca/ f e-9'pace da, and
in = e-pala/ f' e-9*pala da, where ia is the proportion of the population that is age a, lre is the
proportion of total consumption consumed by persons aged a, and ira is the proportion of the labor
force that is age a. The fundamental comparative steady state result is derived by differentiating
(16) with respect to g, imposing the golden rule savings condition that fk = g, and noting that
(y - gk)L = C by the budget constraint:13
Cf 0 ira ad w rf'' O ndc
-kL+ l* da - C airda=C j * n * da - C a*da. (17)
This result can be simplified to
w 8lnc. k w 1nl] ra da= e -at - - + ] ir da. (18)I a9 C 0 ag
Two weighted mean ages appear in (18). a. is the mean age of the cross-section population
when each age is weighted by its share in total consumption. di is simply the mean age of the
labor force.1 4 The interpretation of (18) can be seen with a simple special case. If all changes in
consumption and labor supply implied by (18) are absorbed by constant proportional adjustments
at each age, so that O1n ca/0g = y for all a and Oln la/0g = A for all a, then (18) reduces to
k
ii (e i) - - +A. (19)
C
The proportional change in consumption at each age in response to an increase in the steady state
population growth rate will be equal to the "average age of consumption" minus the "average age
of production" minus the capital-consumption ratio plus the proportional change in labor effort
at each age. If consumption occurs on average at older ages than production, as in Samuelson's
consumption loan model in which there is a period of work followed by a period of retirement, then
the average age terms imply a positive intergenerational transfer effect. If childhood consumption
is included in the model, then the sign of the intergenerational transfer effect is ambiguous, and
Arthur and McNicoll (1978) suggest that it can easily be negative. Whatever the sign of this effect,
there will be an unambiguously negative capital dilution effect of minus the capital consumption
ratio. Arthur and McNicoll (1978) and Lee (1980) suggest that this effect is likely to swamp any
12 The golden rule assumption implies that a new optimal savings rate which maximizes per capita consumption
is chosen whenever the population growth rate changes.
13 See Arthur and McNicoll (1978: 244) and Lee (1980: 1145).
14 It is a standard result in mathematical demography that the effects of changes in the population growth rate
on cross-section population aggregates are described by mean ages and weighted mean ages. See Coale (1972),
Keyfitz (1977), and Preston (1982). Lam (1984) generalizes the result to higher moments of distributions of
population characteristics.
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plausible positive intergenerational transfer effect. Finally, population growth may lead to increases
or decreases in age-specific labor force participation rates.
T'lhe simple neoclassical growth model and consumption loan model can be seen to be special
cases of (19). In a growth model with no age structure, such as Solow (1956), consumption and
production always take place at the same age, so that the intergenerational transfer effect disap-
pears. In the absence of an effect of population growth on labor effort, this leaves the standard
capital dilution effect of population growth for golden rule steady states. In a simple consumption
loan model there is no capital, leaving only the intergenerational transfer effect.
7. Age Structure and Labor Productivity
The continuous age structure models of Arthur and McNicoll and Lee, like the related overlap-
ping generations models of Samuelson (1958, 1976), Deardorff (1976), and Willis (1982), make very
simple assumptions about age-specific labor productivity. In the pure consumption loan model
of Samuelson (1958), life cycle wage profiles are constant, and are simply modeled as age-specific
endowments. The advantages of higher rates of population growth result from the relationship
between age structure and the ability to make intergenerational consumption loans, not from any
effect of age structure on age-specific productivity. When capital is introduced in Samuelson's later
work (1975, 1976) and in the work of Arthur and McNicoll (1977, 1978) and Lee (1980), wages are
affected, but labor is homogeneous except for exogenous variations across age in labor supply or
effort. In other words, labor is is simply a linear aggregation of workers of all ages. Wages at all
ages rise and fall together as the capital-labor ratio responds to varying population growth rates.
Wages vary across ages only because of the exogenous difference in age-specific labor supply or
effort which are built into the models.
Given the theoretical results presented above and the empirical evidence on the effects of
relative age group size on age-specific wages, it is instructive to consider how models of the effects
of population growth are affected by explicitly modeling age-specific productivity as a function of
the relative sizes of all age groups. A more realistic model, for example, will have wages of young
workers moving in the opposite direction from wages of old workers in response to an increase in
the population growth rate.
More realistically, then, modify the model above to let output depend explicitly on the number
of workers at each age Y = F(Kt, Lo,t,..., La,t,..., L,), where La,t is the number of workers aged
a in period t. The model can be generalized in this way and yet kept quite tractable by continuing
to assume that the production function is constant returns to scale. Continue to let la represent
the labor force participation rate of workers aged a. Let to0 denote the marginal product of workers
aged a, with to0 haying a natural interpretation as the competitive wage, though a model of wage
determination need not be specified for most of the results which follow.
It is still true that the budget constraint Y, = Ci- k, must be satislied in every period, and that
/( = gIK in the steady state. Normalizing by labor force size Li = Be ff e-apel, da, the linearly
homogeneous production function can be normalized to y = Y/ = f(k, 4i... , iri,... , i), where
7g, as defined above, is the proportion of the total labor force made up of workers aged a. The only
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modification to the budget constraint in (16), then, is to generalize per worker output, implying
that
[f(k, ,... ,ir,... ,irL,) - gk]j eapala da =f e-apac da. (20)
00
Differentiating (20) with respect to g,
L [ (f kg)-+ fW da +(y - gk)Ffeapa!--da- fae-g pa l daL8 j 0  a 09 aj(0 89 O J
= e~2pa- da - j ae~9paca da. (21)
Imposing the golden rule savings condition that fk = g and noting that. (y - gk)L = C by the
budget constraint, (21) can be rewritten as
arth8nla I *hlac
Ljwa-*-da - kL+C j * ra da - Cat = C Ir da -C e. (22)
099 o 89
The result looks identical to that in (17) except for the first term involving the marginal product
of each age worker. In the previous model, note that all workers have the same marginal product
fi = y - fkk. Substituting this into (22), the first term becomes L(y - fkk) f" w L da, which
vanishes since f - da = 0. In the more general case, it is straightforward to show that
8xi - _ . aGln l a t 49i81a
- =a -o---+--x dal ,
Olnlg - f-aOlgla1
and therefore
l' rtx - " 81n la 81l
wa- da = at - 0e "lda + W1 " da - arawa da
o 09a9 In o go
u, (23)
_ _ waln lQ *181n la=w & la-aw+jIr .* 'da j - "it da ,
o 0 9 o a9
where Ira = e-9palawa/ fW e~apalawa da, the proportion of total wages earned by workers age
a, and w = f" 1rawa da, the mean wage in the working population.
Substituting (23) into (22), imposing the requirement that wL = C in golden rule steady
states, and rearranging terms, the effect of a change in the population growth rate on steady state
lifetime consumption can be summarized as
j*cOlc" da = de-iid - + j" x wlnada. (24)
Tlhe only difference between the comparative steady state result in (24) and the result in (18)
is that the mean age of the labor force and the integral of changes in labor supply are weightedI
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by age-specific wages in the new result. The similarity is surprising, since (24) describes the effect
of population growth for any general constant returns production function with every age worker
considered as a separate factor of production. No assumption has been made about the elasticity
of substitution between workers of different ages. The result is completely general in this respect,
allowing, for example, workers close in age to be substitutes while workers farther apart in age are
complements, or alternatively allowing workers of all ages to be either substitutes or complements.
How is it that (24) summarizes the effects of population growth on per capita lifetime con-
sumption possibilities for any constant returns production function without any specification of the
substitutability of workers of different ages? Surely there is some basis to the intuition that the
effects of a change in age structure in an economy where workers of all ages are perfect substitutes
will be very different than in an economy where there is very limited substitutability across ages.
The answer is that all information about the elasticities of substitution across age groups of workers
and between labor and capital is already captured in the weighted mean ages in (24). The result is
less surprising when it is recalled that the result in (18) describes the effects of population growth
for any constant returns function of capital and labor without any specification of the elasticity of
substitution between capital and labor. In both cases it is not that the elasticity of substitution
does not matter. It is rather that its effects are entirely captured in the mean age terms that
summarize the comparative steady state result.
8. Conclusions
In Samuelson's original overlapping generations economy the lifetime incomes of workers are
constant, modeled as exogenous age-specific endowments. Lifetime utility of workers is affected by
changes in age structure not because of changes in income profiles but because of changes in the
potential for intergenerational borrowing and lending. If a pay-as-you-go social security system is
maintained, for example, higher rates of population growth lead to higher lifetime utility because
of the increased ratio of contributors to dependents.
This paper analyzes a different mechanism through which age structure affects the lifetime
welfare of a representative worker. Exogenous age-specific endowments are replaced with age-
specific wages, where the wages are marginal products from a concave constant returns production
function. For a pure labor economy, the closest analog to Samuelson's pure consumption loan
economy, the paper proves that lifetime wages attain a global minimum when there is a uniform
age distribution. Persistent positive or negative population growth rates, assuming they can be
maintained, always generate higher lifetime wages than those in a stationary population. The
results imply that even in the absence of intergenerational transfers, increases in the population
growth rate would increase the utility of workers if lifetime utility were an increasing function of
lifetime wages. The surprising result that lifetime wages tend to decrease as the age structure moves
closer to uniformity does not appear to have been previously recognized in theoretical analysis of
age-earnings profiles or in models of the economic effects of population growth.
If lifetime wages are discounted at some constant rate, the result generalizes to the condition
that discounted lifetime wages attain a global minimum when the population growth rate equals
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the discount rate. This result may not hold if the discount rate is itself a function of the population
growth rate. In the special case in which the discount rate is always equal to the population
growth rate, corresponding to Samuelson's "biological interest rate," discounted lifetime wages
unambiguously fall with increases in the population growth rate.
The presence of non-labor factors complicates, but does not necessarily reverse, the tendency
for uniformity in the age distribution to minimize lifetime wages. If the population growth rate
directly affects capital-labor ratios, as argued in most previous models of the economic effects
of population growth, capital dilution effects may overcome the effects of population growth on
lifetime wage profiles.
Lifetime wages, discounted or not, cannot describe lifetime utility without consideration of life-
time consumption profiles. In order to capture these effects and to consider the role of capital accu-
mulation, the paper incorporates the effects of age structure on age- specific labor productivity into
models which analyze cross-section social budget constraints in golden rule economic-demographic
steady states. It is proven that previous comparative steady state results based on the assumption
that workers of different ages are perfect substitutes continue to hold for any assumption about
the elasticity of substitution between workers of different ages, providing the "mean ages" which
determine the result are appropriately defined. The surprising robustness of the previous results
occurs not because the elasticities of substitution between workers of different ages do not matter,
but because their effects are captured in the "wage-weighted mean age" of the labor force.
The results demonstrate a number of important and previously unrecognized effects of age
structure on life-cycle wage profiles. The results should not necessarily be interpreted as providing
new ammunition for debates over population policy. Issues of population policy are better analyzed
by looking directly at the optimality of private fertility decisions, as in Nerlove et al. (1987) and
Willis (1987). The effects of age structure on lifetime wages established in this paper do provide
useful insights into the changes in wage profiles that will be observed as populations move closer
to or farther away from uniform age distributions, and fill an important gap in previous models of
the economic effects of changing age structure.
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